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Critical Requirements of a System
of Internal Accounting Control
Robert J. Sack
Touche Ross & Co.
This paper will review those requirements of a system of internal control
which can be considered to be "critical." First, it will be important to define and
clarify some terms, and establish a context for the discussion in the paper. The
body of the paper will review a series of critical requirements, considering first the
required-elements of a system and then considering the required characteristics of
a system. A n d finally, the paper will explore the possibility that leadership is the
most critical element of any internal control system.
Definitions and Context
Before beginning an analysis of the critical requirements of a system, it is important to ask, "critical for what purpose?" In fact, that question can be asked in
a number of ways: We can ask what requirements are critical for the preparation
of accurate financial statements, intended for public reliance. Or we can ask what
requirements are critical for the preservation and protection of the entity's assets.
Or we can ask what requirements are critical to the development of operating and
analytical data, necessary for the running of the business. A system that is designed to assure reliable operating data will function at a level of detail, and with
such breadth as to assure the protection of assets, and the development of accurate, public financial statements. Because that is the broadest objective, that will
be the context of this paper.
By establishing that broad objective, we will also be saying that we expect the
system to control errors at a fairly low level of materiality. Because the system
must provide accurate information for operating decisions, materiality will be
measured against the cost of a wrong decision. Because decisions are ongoing, a
wrong decision can have a multiplying effect, and the measure of materiality—the
tolerance of the system—must be quite low. Conversely, if we had said that the
objective of the system was to preserve the entity's assets, the standards of the
system—the materiality of the losses it is designed to control—could be relatively
easier. The assets of the entity may be quite valuable, but it is usually more effective to insure against the loss of an asset, rather than to design a system which will
provide comprehensive protection against its loss. Or, if we had said that the objective of the system was to produce accurate financial statements for public consumption, the standards applied to the system—the measure of materiality
required—might have been even less stringent. Published financial statements
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present a macro view of the entity, summarizing a host of individual transactions.
If our objective was only to produce accurate published statements, it would be
wasteful to establish a system which controlled to a level of materiality greater
than that which would impact the statements themselves.
The fact that there might be different standards and different measures of
materiality for different objectives of a system seems clear, upon reflection. Still,
we stumble over the idea that published financial statements might not be subject
to a first level system of controls. That anomaly is one cause of the continuing
conflict over the SEC's proposal to require public reporting on internal control
systems. Careful research into this materiality question would be helpful to all of
those who work with systems, at the various levels—corporate executives, internal auditors, and external auditors.
Also, when we talk about a system of internal control, it is important to
understand how the word "system" is used. For purposes of this discussion, the
word "system'' must mean all elements of the company which are directed to the
gathering and presentation of operating and analytical data—the objective of the
system which we described at the outset. Let us be clear that we mean all of the
quantitative factors which are normally ascribed to a "system," including policies
and procedures, or tests and checks. But also the "system" must be understood
to include qualitative factors characteristic of the entity, including its ethical code
and its business atmosphere.
Because this discussion is directed to a "system," it should be understood
that the discussion is directed to an entity of some size. Typically, the smaller entities find it impossible or impractical to employ the usual quantitative elements of
a system and so they must rely on the qualitative elements for their internal controls. The unique internal control problems of the smaller entities warrant an entirely separate discussion. The discussion in this paper will assume that the system
we are analyzing operates in an entity of enough size to justify both quantitative
and qualitative aspects.
The body of this paper will discuss the elements and the characteristics of a
system as individual factors. In an analysis of the critical aspects of a system, it is
necessary to review the system in pieces. However, it should be understood that
the pieces do not operate individually, but function as a system of internal control.
We will presume that all of the elements of the system work together in a coordinated way, with proper balance. Coordination and unification may be one of the
most critical requirements of a system of internal control. But that requirement
may be presumed in an analysis of the individual factors which make up the total,
and the search for critical requirements must go deeper into the system's component parts.
T h e Critical Elements of a System of Internal Control
There are two ways to approach an inquiry into the critical requirements of a
system of internal control. One approach is to ask what elements are required.
A n d this next section will review the elements of a system which can be considered to be critical to the system overall.
Checks and Balances One of the most critical elements of a system of internal
control is a requirement that no one individual has complete jurisdiction over an
accounting transaction. Typically, we say that the cashier must not have access to
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the accounts receivable records, lest he be given the opportunity to kite remittances. But also, checks and balances are important in a broader sense. It is important that a second perspective be brought to all accounting entries, including those
which might not have a direct cash effect. For example, monthly journal entries
ought to be reviewed and approved by someone independent of the preparer. That
independent check is important not because the preparer might be tempted to
manipulate an entry for his own advantage, but because the preparer cannot be expected to independently challenge his own work.
In the same way that a system of checks and balances is critical for the system
of internal control overall, a clear line of responsibility is critical for the successful
operation of the checks and balances. It is of course important that the lines of
responsibility within the entity be clearly understood and maintained. But more
fundamentally, the responsibility lines must be challenged to be sure that they are
logical and not just traditional. It has been traditional to have the internal audit
department report directly to the entity's top financial officer. However, to
preserve the effectiveness of the internal audit function as a corporate balance
wheel, it is more logical to make the internal audit department responsible directly
to the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors.
Policies and Procedures Written policies and procedures are critical to the success of the system because they establish a consistent response, determined in advance, apart from the heat of the moment. Comprehensive, written policies and
procedures promote the efficiency of the system, of course. But more importantly,
they reduce the possibility of an ad hoc response to a problem, and they therefore
reduce the possibility of management override.
The accounts receivable control clerk knows that he is responsible to reconcile
the details of the customer accounts with the receivable control account. Written
procedures tell him where he is to find the reconciling data, and they also tell
others in the organization that he is entitled to have that data. But to have real
payoff, the policies and procedures describing his job must tell him what he is to
do, and who he is to contact when he encounters unusual, or unreconcilable
items. His instructions should be sufficiently specific so that he will not be
dissuaded from a vigorous pursuit of problems he encounters in the reconciliation
process.
The written policies and procedures should establish the parameters of the
system. The written procedures must establish who is authorized to enter into or
approve transactions. A n d the operating procedures must set the limits of those
authorizations. For example, if the accounts payable clerk is to monitor the entity's disbursements—to be sure that the entity pays only for what it ordered—he
must understand:
1. How large a commitment the purchasing agent is entitled to make;
2. How much of an overshipment, beyond the amount ordered by the
purchasing agent, the disbursement agent is entitled to approve; and
3. What he must do with the transaction that exceeds those limits.
Incidentally, the disbursing/purchasing agent example here provides an illustration of the need for a logical reporting relationship, and an opportunity to depart
from a traditional relationship. Traditionally, it might have been appropriate for
the disbursing agent to review all overshipments with the purchasing agent, and
abide by his approval of any excesses. However, a logical analysis of the transac27

tion and the objective of the controls suggests that the disbursing agent ought to
refer all excess shipments to the purchasing agent's superior—so as to preserve
the integrity of the control which restricts the ability of the purchasing agent to
commit the entity to transactions of a limited amount.
Capable People The system must be operated by people who have the skills to
do their job. There are some obvious skills which anyone participating in a system
of control must have—including the ability to deal with forms and with numbers.
But those skills may be presumed, and are not at issue here. More importantly,
the people who operate the various aspects of the system must have the ability to
understand the implications of their findings. The credit and collection people
must understand the system enough to know what it means when the receivables
of a division begin to show serious past-due problems. They must understand that
a pattern of past-due receivables may be indicative of an economic problem in that
division's region. But they must also understand that it may be indicative of account manipulation.
In addition to having the ability to do their job, the people operating the
system must have the time (and the other resources required) to do their job completely. Internal controls are most effective when they are exercised on a timely
basis. The timely exercise of controls preserves the integrity of the system. A n d in
some cases (particularly where the objective of the system is to assure accurate
operating data) timely exercise of controls may be critical, in and of itself. For example, the unit which is responsible for the preparation of customer invoices must
be adequately staffed such that they are able to promptly account for the
numerical sequence of shipping documents. Where that control is a vital step in
assuring that all of the goods shipped are billed, it must be exercised on a timely
basis:
1. T o assure that the customer is invoiced promptly so that the entity's
cash flow is maintained,
2. T o let the people in the shipping unit understand that their activities are
subject to the oversight of an independent unit,
3. T o assure that the records of finished goods, and the resultant
production schedules are maintained accurately.
A n d finally, the people operating the system must have a sense of personal integrity. Personnel procedures should be designed to inquire into the background of
individuals who are hired to run the system, and of course appropriate bonding
contracts provide fall-back protection. T o maintain that individual integrity, the
overall system must be maintained. The environment of the system, the atmosphere of the entity, is the subject of the concluding section of this paper.
Oversight and Supervision A l l of the elements described above presume a
hierarchical structure which supervises the operation of the system. That supervision must be both apparent and real. The supervisory hierarchy ought not to be
involved in the day to day affairs of their supervised units, but they should be involved in the resolution of conflicts, and the follow-up on exceptions. T o the extent that they do so, the involvement of the supervisory hierarchy in the system is
real. But for the system to be effective on a long-term basis, that supervision must
also be apparent. The supervision must follow up on exceptions promptly to keep
the pipeline clean and to demonstrate the strength of the controls. Without that
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supervisory follow-up, the system soon appears to be weak, and eventually
becomes weak.
A healthy system requires a balance between strong supervision and individual integrity. The individuals operating the system must understand that
their operations are scrutinized: But they also must understand that there are
limits to the authority of the supervision. They must feel confident of their position so that they can maintain their own integrity, and the integrity of the system.
There is something about that individual confidence which is within the individual himself: But that individual confidence can be enhanced by a comprehensive
set of policies and procedures which describes the individual's position, establishes
his authority, and spells out the role (and the limits) of the supervisor.
T h e Critical Characteristics of a System of Internal C o n t r o l
A s noted earlier, there are two ways to approach an inquiry into the critical requirements of a system of internal control. The first approach, above, was to inquire into the elements of a system. A second approach is to ask what
characteristics are required in a system.
A Cost/Benefit Relationship A l l controls have benefits, and of course every
control has a cost. One of the characteristics of a properly designed system of internal controls is that the cost/benefit relationship has been thoroughly thought
out, and the tradeoffs carefully evaluated. T o make that evaluation, the system
planners must identify all of the costs of the proposed controls, and all of the
benefits as well. For example, a department store's credit experience would benefit
from a control that required specific approval of every credit card transaction.
However, the cost in customer frustration would likely exceed the benefits obtained. Therefore, most stores have established a floor limit, which allows the
sales clerk to complete the sale without obtaining credit department approval so
long as the transaction is below a designated dollar limit.
Often, there are different levels of benefits which accompany a control. There
are the obvious benefits which inspired the control in the first place. But on a second level, the system as a whole may be enhanced by individual controls—the
system as a whole may benefit from an atmosphere of control which flows from
strengthened individual controls. A n d there may be benefits outside the entity,
which will in turn benefit the entity. Stronger controls over purchasing (for instance, a requirement to obtain a number of bids for purchases beyond a certain
amount) may benefit the entity's suppliers and in turn may benefit the entity. If
the suppliers are freed from the possibility of paying gratuities to the entity's purchasing units, the supplier's prices may be lower and service more businesslike
and straightforward.
The passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1978, introduced a new
element to the cost/benefit analysis. The Act talks only about controls and
benefits, but does not deal with costs. Many critics of the Act have said that it is
impractical because it does not explicitly deal with the cost/benefit question.
However, one of the Congressmen who sponsored the Act answered those
challenges in the following way:
a. Congress understood the need for a cost/benefit relationship, and there
was never any intention that an entity would have to control itself out of
business. However, Congress was not prepared to legislate an analysis of
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a cost/benefit tradeoff. Instead, they felt that it was more appropriate to
let that tradeoff be analyzed in the courts. That approach is traditional
for Congress—they reason that laws cannot be totally precise, and ambiguities are to be settled on a case-by-case basis through the court
system. Nonetheless, most business people are very uncomfortable with
that traditional approach to a law which goes to the heart of their
business. T o the legislators it may be a traditional approach, but to the
business people it appears cavalier.
b. The sponsor of the bill has also cautioned business people to consider all
of the benefits when they make their cost/benefit analysis. He observed
that an entity must of course consider the benefits which accrue to it
directly and indirectly. But also he suggested that an entity must consider the benefits which accrue to society as a whole. He agreed that
controls against bribery might not benefit an entity directly, and perhaps
not even indirectly. However, he stated that Congress had concluded
that society would benefit greatly from controls against bribery, and that
the societal benefit ought to be included in each entity's cost/benefit
equation. In the abstract, that notion is noble: In a specific situation,
however, that idea makes a rational cost/benefit analysis almost impossible.
Specific and Anticipatory A system of internal control should not be designed
in the abstract but in the specific. The system should not be designed to establish
specific controls, but it should be designed to control specific potential errors. The
designers of the system (and those who are asked to evaluate the system) must ask
themselves, "What could go wrong, and what controls will prevent those errors
from getting out of hand?" That analysis requires a thorough understanding of
the entity's objectives and the transactions to be controlled.
The development of controls to deal with specific error types will of course
proceed from experience. It will not be difficult to design controls to deal with errors that have occurred before. It takes more imagination to anticipate problems
that could occur, given a little twist on history.
There are a number of tools which have proven to be helpful to this error/control analysis:
1.The analysis might begin by developing a series of control questions
suitable to each of the entity's business systems. For the payroll cycle,
the control questions might ask—What controls assure that payroll cost
is properly classified? What controls assure that individuals are paid
only for time worked? What controls assure that payroll records are accurate?
2.Often, the analysis is enhanced when the entity's data flow is
flowcharted. Good flowcharting procedures identify potential conflicts of
interest and control omissions.
3.The analysts should plan to spend a disproportionate amount of time
and attention on the more exotic transactions. It is relatively easy to
design a system which exercises control over purchasing of raw
material. It is more difficult to design a system to control purchasing of
fixed assets, because the transaction is usually one of a kind. It is even
more difficult to design a system to control purchases of services,
because of the intangible nature of the benefit received.
Implementability The system will be operated by people and the system's
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demands must not exceed their capabilities. Earlier, this paper argued that one of
the critical elements of a system was that it be manned by capable people. T o say
that the system must be implementable is not to contradict that earlier
requirement—nor is it redundant. Rather, to ask that the system be implementable is to ask that it be practical. For example:
1. The system should not ask the petty cash clerk to approve the
President's travel expense report;
2. The system should not ask a clerk to obtain his supervisor's approval for
transactions in excess of $ 500 if the average transaction is $400;
3. The system should not ask for the simultaneous participation of two
people if manning tables provide for two people only during peak
periods.
Leadership Is T h e Critical Requirement
A l l of the features of a system of internal control which we have discussed so
far are important. However, the most critical requirement of any system is leadership. With appropriate leadership, the most rudimentary of systems can function
effectively. Without control-conscious leadership, the most tightly drawn system
will fail.
The leaders of the entity can affect the system in many ways. Most obviously,
they affect the system in the way they allocate resources. Control systems cost
money, and use valuable people. Even where a careful cost/benefit analysis apparently justifies a control, the leadership of the entity may be hesitant. They may
be reluctant to commit the resources because the payout is immediate while the
benefit appears to be a longer term thing. Or they may be tempted to put their
money where the return is more tangible. But, there is no free lunch; an underresourced control system carries a sure cost which must ultimately be paid. The
investment in controls requires an element of vision and a sense of perspective.
Also, the leaders of the entity affect the system in the way that they operate it.
By definition, the leaders of the entity are in a position to make the system work
or fail. Where the system calls for a cross check, or a follow-up, the leaders of the
entity must allocate their attention to those duties. Careful attention to the control
system by the subordinates will be for naught if the leadership fails to diligently
play their role.
Ultimately, the leadership of the company affects the control system most by
the tone they set for the entity. A n Audit Committee, or a Board of Directors who
tolerate unethical conduct in a corporate officer is inviting unethical conduct from
other officers and employees as well. A n officer of an entity who winks at his own
system is inviting his associates to do the same. Control is an attitude, and
establishing an entity's attitudes is a prime responsibility of leadership.
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